04c: The Monroe Doctrine

Fall of the Spanish Empire
For most of the 18th century, Spain had been battered by the British, French, and Dutch. Stifled by bureaucracy and corruption, and woefully overextended around the world, the Spaniards couldn't put up much of a resistance when Napoleon made them give the Louisiana territory back. After that, nationalist movements began to rise up in Central and South America, in imitation of the United States. After the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory, the new boundaries with Spanish America caused a series of Spanish-American border wars, many caused by the future hero of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson. Once more, the US was looking for more territory. By 1815, the Spanish Empire was in tatters. Shattered by its flirtation with Napoleon, Spain now had to fight revolutions in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Jumping on Spain while the jumping was good, the US wrested Florida away through the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819.

Colonial Maneuvers
The Central and South American revolutionaries began to fight for their independence from the reeling Spanish Empire. Despite American admiration for their courage, the US recognized the new Central and South American democracies in 1822, without promising any military support. The new democracies were pleased by America's show of respect, but they really wanted American support. At first, US President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams followed Washington's warning to "avoid foreign entanglements." The revolutionaries' admiration was touching, but should the US risk a war with Spain for democracies which might not even survive?   It seemed safest to let Spain and her rebellious colonies fight it out, provided that no other European powers jumped in on Spain's side. In 1823, Russia and France pledged to help Spain recover its former Empire. They proposed that Great Britain join them. A coalition of Spain, France, Russia, and Britain launching a crusade against democracy would certainly crush the new Central and South American democracies. Would it stop there, or would the coalition confront the homeland of modern democracy - the United States? Monroe, who had been secretary of war during the War of 1812, knew the risks. The war with Britain had ended in a draw. Should Britain accept membership in the Spanish/French/Russian coalition, things would not look good for America.

Fortunately for the United States, the British hated France more than they loved the concept of monarchy. They had not forgotten the War of 1812 any more than the Americans had forgotten it. Russia was too remote to present much of a threat, and Spain was too weak. But France posed a definite threat. French troops re-entering the New World was unthinkable. A new French Empire in Central and South America would be disastrous for Britain - militarily, politically, and economically. Britain instead proposed an alliance with the US - a joint ultimatum to keep France and Spain from intervening in the Americas. Ex-Presidents Jefferson and Madison advised President Monroe to accept the proposal. But Secretary of State John Quincy Adams suspected British motives. Adams also knew Russia wanted to extend its influence in the Pacific Northwest. This was not, strictly speaking, America's problem. California belonged to the republic of Mexico, which was desperately seeking an alliance with the US. Still, Adams didn't want any more Russians coming down from Alaska, nor did he want Britain expanding its Oregon Territory. An alliance with Britain would be helpful, but it would also be a foreign entanglement. Adams recommended instead that the US warn Spain, France, and Russia to stay out of the Western Hemisphere on the US's own authority, without British help.

The Monroe Doctrine
Adams was convinced that the United States had to act unilaterally. His arguments finally pushed President Monroe and his Cabinet toward an independent policy. On December 2, 1823, Monroe expressed in his Message to Congress an approach now known as the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, the "John Quincy Adams Doctrine" would be a far more accurate name. Essentially, the United States was making two important points. First, the New World was no longer open to colonization by the Old World. Second, the New World was now an American sphere of influence.

But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

President Madison neglected to mention that Great Britain (especially the Royal Navy) was a silent partner in this proclamation. Provided that Britain could conduct trade with the new Central and South American democracies, its silent partnership was a very good deal for all involved. Although the Monroe Doctrine observed the letter of Washington's warning against "foreign entanglements," it actually announced to the world that the United States was a major world power. Some have argued that the Monroe Doctrine was isolationist in nature: the European powers could do as they liked everywhere else, but the Americas would be reserved for US influence alone. This is in large part true: before the beginning of the 20th century, the United States generally kept out of European affairs whenever possible. Others have argued that the Monroe Doctrine was an imperialist blank check, allowing the US government to intervene in the Americas wherever and whenever it saw fit. This view is well backed up by countless examples of red-handed American interference in the Latin American countries. Examples of this interference include, the Mexican War of 1846 to 1848, the 1914 coup in Mexico, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, and the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The United States was also known to let European powers stamp out occasional revolutions in the Caribbean Islands. The one certain thing is that the US had publicly committed itself to an official foreign policy (if not exactly an alliance), and that future Presidents would be expected to honor it as well.